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When I first considered how I could improve my Headquarters’ awareness of the geostrategic environment sur-
rounding us, I realized that the widely used “Comprehensive Approach”, in an ever changing world, implies per se 
continuous research, continuous refining of our ways to think, to decide and to act. This challenges us to adapt our 
own mindset, our own perception of things. In fact, although many events somehow repeat themselves in the end-
less cycle of history, the dynamics, the key factors, the ways and means change accordingly. 
Hence, the crucial need to optimize all resources available in order to get it right. In this respect, the Academic World 
represents a unique source of intellectual strength, a key enabler for our knowledge and informer of our decision 
making process. 
The NRDC-ITA EAGLE EYE 2018, then, has become of itself the ideal environment in which military personnel and 
academics together foster a frank, open and objective dialogue. 
More than that, this creation of a renewed “way to think”, has been designed to allow for an intellectually stimulating 
environment in which we can indeed “co-work” – and I use the portmanteau verb advisedly. I think co-working goes 
well beyond coordination, interaction and so forth. In my understanding, co-working epitomizes a real synergy, a 
conscious and active working together by all elements of a power system.  
The second reason was then to obtain something tangible. A product, that can represent a baseline, a guide, a stim-
ulus to further study, and also a reference for spreading awareness in our domain.
In fact, past, current and future operations are and will be characterized by the key preliminary phase: UNDER-
STAND, understand the reality surrounding us. In the words of one of our distinguished academics, this will help 
us all to “avoid the perfect storm”. 
Understanding allows for knowledge; knowledge allows for empowerment. This is the second milestone of our ef-
fort. We need to empower those who lead and those who are to be led. 
To this end, even the lowest level is to be empowered to take the right decisions, under considerable pressure and in 
real time. Understanding the situation, knowing the overall design, empowers those who are to act to do so properly, 
effectively; thus avoiding catastrophic fallouts for the overall mission.      
Additionally, we must identify the key crisis. As the SAHEL discussion proved, the factors for instability can be sim-
ilar for the whole region, but their relative importance and their combining may vary; and so must be measured 
against multiple dimensions: cultural, ethnic, social, institutional, economic and so on. A stable and secure environ-
ment does not rely only on the military/security line of operation. 
The Armed Forces must operationalize, and include all actors, in our planning, in our endeavours. This will not, of 
course, provide us with a decisive solution for a crisis. However, thereby planners and operators, today and in the 
future, may avoid being too far off the mark whilst considering each element’s contribution to stability.
My wholehearted thanks go to all academics for their commitment and true passion in this common endeavour. 
They were able to raise thoughts, understand different aspects, whet our interest in examining, more deeply, fields 
other than the military one.   
I am convinced that, today and in the future, our co-working must be enhanced and improved. A veil of uncertainty 
shrouds the whole world; it is our duty to work together for the current and future leaders, at any level, to under-
stand, empower, and operationalize our endeavour for a better future.
I am confident that this special edition of our Everywhere Rapidly magazine, which collects the key facts and deduc-
tions of our studies will provide a significant contribution to the ongoing discussion on stability, as well as a quick 
reference for further development both in the military and the academic fora.  
Lieutenant General Roberto Perretti




4  /  SPECIAL EDITION
In a changing world, political priorities, security threats 
and sources of instability constantly evolve. Unfortu-
nately, the world changes faster than the ability to adapt 
of national institutions and international organizations. 
The end result is that, on many occasions, policy mak-
ers and technical operators have to deal with problems 
that have already matured and exploded. The ultimate 
consequence is that, while dealing with these problems 
and vulnerabilities, we find ourselves acting according 
to a logic of perennial emergency. In this sense, the 
geopolitics of the last 10 years have provided us with 
dramatic concrete examples, from the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring to the birth and evolution of Daesh and the 
massive wave of migration from Africa to Europe.
Nonetheless, EAGLE EYE 2018 could likely epitomize 
an important inversion of tendency, starting from the 
experience NATO gained during the Cold War years and 
coming to the present day, when the Atlantic Alliance 
has proved itself able to quickly adapt to the changing 
world, modifying the approaches towards an evolving 
security context. In fact, with the creation of the South-
ern Hub, the Alliance has recognized the importance 
of another geographical area other than the renowned 
“Eastern Front” and, from a methodological point of 
view, has included a range of threats different from 
those that, traditionally, belonged to the Soviet Union 
first and to Russia later.
In doing so, the Alliance has recognised that there are 
factors different from the Armed Forces of a hostile 
country. Hybrid and non-conventional factors of insta-
bility that, however, can threaten the solidity of the Eu-
ro-Atlantic block in a clear and direct way. This interest 
in the southern front, towards the hybrid and non-con-
ventional threats, well matches the parallel evolution of 
the concept of stability policing, a fundamental activity 
of intervention both in the embryonic phases of a pos-
sible conflict, by neutralizing its causes, or in the imme-
diately following phases, in order to guide and support 
the processes of peace building, security and strength-
ening of good governance. 
In this sense, Africa is the continent where non-con-
ventional and hybrid threats to European and Atlan-
tic security develop faster but, at the same time, in a 
more systemic, unpredictable and inter-connected way. 
In fact, the proliferation of jihadist terrorism, the mul-
tiplication and strengthening of criminal networks, the 
increase in outbreaks and volume of migraton flows are 
all linked phenomena that share many of their original 
factors. These original factors can be divided into two 
macro-categories, one structural and one contingent. 
The first is related to long-term phenomena, while the 
second comprises events limited in time or the result 
of circumscribed circumstances. Among the structural 
factors, the most important are the economic-social and 
political ones, such as population growth, growth in the 
urbanization rates, climate change and land grabbing, 
gaps in governance and lack of the rule of law.
Similar trends, which began in the 1980s, produced an 
enormous pool of labour force and, above all, a new 
African bourgeoisie which, thanks to the spread of the 
internet, has become constantly informed and with cos-
mopolitan aspirations. However, the structure of Afri-
can economic systems, still tied to a predatory model of 
selling raw materials, is not able either to absorb labour 
force nor to satisfy the job ambitions of the bourgeoisie. 
Similarly, entire generations of Africans, in addition to 
seeing their economic aspirations not met, had to face 
the deafness of self-referential, nepotistic and corrupt 
political systems, incapable of enhancing the human 
resources available to them and satisfying the identity 
claims of minorities, who are discriminated against.
In fact, since their independence from colonial patron-
age, African countries, with rare exceptions, have been 
unable to produce either a responsible ruling class or 
transparent and fully democratic government structures. 
In most of Africa, citizens are unable to express their 
electoral will clearly and effectively, nor do they see 
their civil and political rights adequately protected. Of-
ten dominated by tribalism or familyism, African societ-
ies do not perceive the presence of a wall that should 
separate private and collective interests, thus transform-
ing state bureaucracies into the tentacles of the power 
of elitist groups and fuelling marginalization and alien-
ation. An additional structural political factor concerns 
the very structure of African countries.
Specifically, it is about their ethnic-cultural lack of ho-
mogeneity and the underlying defect that accompanies 
their birth. In fact, most of the continent’s State actors, 
with rare exceptions such as Ethiopia and South Afri-
ca, did not arise from national struggles promoted by 
indigenous ruling classes, but rather were born from 
the minds of the European colonial powers during the 
Introduction
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era of imperialism. The borders traced by the logic of 
influence outside Africa have defined a political map 
in which ethnic groups and religious groups tradition-
ally in conflict or totally alien to each other have been 
forced to live in the same territory and to share the same 
administrative structures. The final effect of this histor-
ical imposition is that the African continent is made up 
of dozens of States in which hundreds of nations are 
incessantly enclosed, incessantly struggling for self-de-
termination and liberation since the end of colonialism. 
A similar and perpetual repetition of unheard demands, 
as well as producing a tense political debate, has often 
resulted in conflicts with a variable intensity that are 
now cankerous and seemingly interminable. In addi-
tion, in the last 20 years, many of these ethnic-sectarian 
conflicts have been polluted by the rhetoric of Islamist 
extremism, unfortunately skilled in manipulating na-
tional narratives and co-opting the agendas of insurgent 
movements, thus turning them into local fronts of global 
jihad.
It is quite easy to understand how, in a context charac-
terized by similar structural problems, the contingent 
factors act as authentic and further accelerators. These 
contingent factors can be divided into economic and 
political. Usually, amongst the former one must consider 
also natural disasters (floods, eruptions, earthquakes) or 
unforeseen environmental crises that lead to the sud-
den collapse of the productive apparatus, especially the 
agro-food sector, and generate i humanitarian crises. 
Specifically, this category includes famines, drought, 
livestock epidemics and pest invasions.
The set of variables included in the category of contin-
gent political and security factors is much more com-
plex. In this sense, taking into consideration the 2007-
2017 decade, one can notice the very high number of 
crises and conflicts that have gripped the African conti-
nent and the competition of factors that, in a different 
way, have contributed to facilitating phenomena such 
as migration or jihadist revolts. Since 2007, the year of 
the first Tuareg uprising in Niger, until the Kasai conflict 
(2016), Africa has experienced the worst conflicts of the 
recent past, such as the al-Shabaab terrorist campaigns 
in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, the war in Mali 
and in the Central African Republic, the Anglophone re-
bellion in the Cameroonian Ambazonia. 
The analysis of African social, political and security vul-
nerabilities allows us to understand how, in the current 
state of things, they are destined to last for the coming 
decades. In fact, Africa is characterized by constant pop-
ulation growth, equal to 2.1% per year for the next 30 
years and a growing level of urbanization. This means 
that, in 2050, Africans will be about 2.5 billion, account-
ing for 26% of the world’s population, of which over 
one billion and 300 million will live in cities. Their aver-
age age will be 24 years. Urbanization and demographic 
growth will go hand in hand with the increase in the 
level of access to new technologies, Internet and glob-
al communication networks. Therefore, African society 
will be increasingly inter-connected, both internally and 
with the outside world. In contrast, the rates of eco-
nomic growth for the African continent, as forecasted 
at the time of writing (1.3% per year) will not be able 
to absorb the huge flow of labour force that will result 
from the population explosion, unless deep structural 
reforms, productive, commercial and tertiary systems 
will be put in place to sustain the needs of the popula-
tion or its indigenous development aspirations. As if this 
were not enough, climate change will reduce, especially 
in the northern African area and close to the equatorial 
belt, the percentage of arable land that can be used for 
grazing. Based on these considerations, it is clear that 
the African population, in the coming decades, will have 
strong incentives for emigration, armed struggle and ji-
hadist recruitment even higher than today.
2
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As an incipit, one can observe that it is remarkable that 
the renewed interests on the African continent allows 
for a first initial consideration.- At the end of the block 
confrontation, and despite the paramount importance 
of the stability of the continent, former masters or con-
trollers lift the grip on African countries, leaving new 
entities and new actors to fill the gaps together with 
just a few remaining (France above all)  to influence the 
political and economic processes within the continent.
Africa: thinking ahead
This originated a centrifugal force where the former 
homogenous blocks were replaced, in time, by diverg-
ing political systems, mainly non-democratic in the first 
phase and strictly related to the local cultures, traditions 
and social dynamics. Different macroeconomic models, 
strictly deriving from the former effect and conditioned 
also by the framework inherited from the former mas-
ters, together with fault lines of different civilizations 
crossed by westphalian-style borders, brought to bear 
multiple challenges: first and foremost the emergence 
of transnational security challenges. Mainly materialized 
by former feuds and border disputes, coupled with the 
insertion of new actors moved by the richness of the 
continent to be exploited, caused further weakness and 
limited resilience of the new institutions emerged after 
the post colonial period.
Nonetheless, the exploitation of the resources brought 
also a clear and defined economic growth and an in-
creasing resource and services internal demand. How-
ever, the lack of internal actors caused a progressive, 
mounting debt of countries forced to recur to external 
multinational actors to gather the necessary investments 
in the various fields. 
 Another significant factor lies within the consequent 
demographic change and the so called “urbanization”. 
In fact the last phenomenon, common in other areas of 
the world subject to sudden and geometric economic 
growth, concentrated masses around the capitals and 
major cities, in essence population hoping for a better 
future, strictly dependent, nonetheless, by the volatility 
of the GDP growth, not always sustained in time and 
whose settling presented significant fluctuations. Indeed 
a social problem, where the old tribal views collided 
against the new age, in an ever growing communica-
tions and information technology, widely restricted to 
those in search for a new opportunity.
If that heavily impacted internally, in time, the “contrac-
tion” and inward-looking of former masters and part-
ners, it left also the young African institutions in a very 
limited position to influence the global balance.
From the physical side, the inner size of the continent, 
able to contain within the major countries in the world 
in terms of extension, and the wide diversity in terms 
of culture and traditions (over 1000 languages spoken, 
a myriad of ethnic minorities and so forth) represent-
ed itself a considerable challenge to define a common 
understanding and position within a country itself. The 
challenge represented by the lack of strategic lines of 
communications, the length of those existing, provided 
for a difficult transnational, synchronized  improvement. 
We were and we are facing an African “multiple speed” 
development, where some areas quickly gained an ac-
ceptable degree of development, whereas others were 
left completely alien to this effect; a diverse and diverg-
ing situation that will not have a solution in the short or 
in the mid-term.
Economic Trends
In terms of economic recovery, however, the African 
countries, in terms of statistic data, are doing satisfacto-
rily despite the various limiting factors discussed hith-
erto. In fact, on the overall performance of the African 
countries, according to the Oxford Economic Data FY 
analysis, shows a progressive and sustainable recovery 
in the first 15 years of the 21st century, where the major-
ity of the countries overcome the negative growth of the 
last two fiscal years of the last century. And the forecast 
out to 2030 confirms the trend, though there will be 
fluctuations in single countries. Focusing on the sub-Sa-
haran Africa, and according to the International Mone-
tary Fund,  there is still economic growth in the area, 
though the FY 2016 was the slowest in the last 20 years. 
Nonetheless, the outlook sees a progressive recovery, 
with a 3,5-3,9 GDP growth by 2020-2022.
Another significant aspect that highlights also the in-
coming of new actors on the African continent refers to 
the Foreign Direct Investment projects and funding. Al-
though the former still shows the major commitment of 
western countries, the related sourcing shifted consid-
erably in the last ten years, with the Asia Pacific Region 
and the Middle East surging to a combined 65 percent 
of the overall capitals invested in the last five years.  A 
clear turn around that has China surging to a leading 
power in the African landscape.
In fact, the China- Africa trade balance statistics of the 
IMF depict clearly the dramatic surge of the ever increas-
ing role of China, from an almost non existing trade of 
the early years of the 21st century to a considerable 
100 billions USD between 2012 and 2014. A trend that, 
although the balance in the recent years have slightly 
diminished its overall volume- likely to be influenced 
by the Chinese One belt one Road project - certifies the 
foothold of the Chinese in the continent. 
The instability factors
in the Sub-Saharan Africa:
a perspective
by Alex Vines
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Chinese do not look at Africa in terms of outreaching 
new markets for the Chinese production alone. The trade 
off must be seen also in terms of the endless search by 
PRC of natural resources to sustain Beijing increasing 
needs. Although the PRC looks also to other parts of 
the world for mutual, “win-win” solutions, some African 
countries are still key to its expanding strategy on the 
market.  This, if compared to the decreasing imports of 
oil by the US from the African continent, proves once 
again the role of China in the African economic and po-
litical dimension. However, and if one sits from the Afri-
can perspective,  a projection elaborated by Bloomberg 
proves  the hypothesis of “diverse-diverging” landscape 
of African countries still remains and China has not yet 
achieved a “synchronizing effect” on the macroeconom-
ical system of the region. In the future, at least in the 
short term and in the field of oil sustainable production, 
some African countries will lose their privileged posi-
tion, whilst others, like Nigeria for example, will be on 
the winning side, conquering a better role in the global 
market.
Another fluctuating factor in this respect is represented 
by the oil price itself, which impacts heavily on the GDP 
of many African countries. If the trend is confirmed, by 
2025, the global reduction of oil prices will have more 
than a significant impact on the GDP of countries which 
sit either in the subsaharan region or on the southern 
shore of the Mediterranean.
Conflict trends
Another domain which strongly influenced the security 
situation in the sub-Saharan Africa can be drawn from 
the history of conflicts in the continent. The first fact to 
highlight is that something like 30 countries are part 
or are directly linked to subsaharan Africa. Of those, in 
history, over 65 percent have been involved in conflicts. 
As for the surge of conflicts in the continent, the ma-
jority of them rose in the aftermath of independence of 
the single countries. As for the duration of the conflicts 
themselves, which constitutes the fourth aspect of the 
analysis, 64 percent lasted five years or less, whereas 22 
percent overcame the ten years threshold. The impact 
in terms of losses of life is another aspect that  is some-
how unknown: it must be noted that the magnitude of 
losses in human life in Africa due to conflicts between 
1960 and 2008 is less than those recorded in Asia in the 
same period. 
The recent trend embodies a decisive shift to the na-
ture of the conflicts and losses mainly due, in line with 
the rest of the world, to the effect of crossing borders, 
mobile insurgent groups with different affiliations and 
ideology, such as AQIM, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram. What 
renders this analysis relevant to the discussion is that 
the geographical distribution of conflicts shows that the 
vast majority occurred in the sub-Saharan Africa or in 
areas directly linked to such as the Maghreb and the 
Horn of Africa. 
Getting deeper in the human factor, in the root causes of 
the surge of the militant groups in Africa, a 2010 study 
referred to Mali and the West Bank indicates that the 
overarching factor for African males to join the militants 
lies, mainly, in the ideological factors, where the feel of 
safety and protection and unemployment counts at odds 
between the West Bank and Mali. As for the external 
influence to security, the US and France still provide the 
strongest presence of military bases in the continent, 
although the recent positioning of other countries could 
indicate a different outlook for the near future. This 
must not  lead to associate, though, the presence of bas-
es with the actual figures concerning military advisors 
or trainers. The role of other countries, mainly China 
and with some return of Russian influence, reveals that 
the future can unfold a more competitive environment.
The political landscape and stability trends
The old perception of longstanding rulers in the area, 
corroborated by actual figures until the recent years, in-
dicates also that the recent events and the development 
achieved provided for a shift to the equation. In many 
countries, the dynamics led to a majority of success-
ful post-term bids by negotiation or elections. Despite 
some exceptions, or undefined situations, the era of the 
longstanding leaders appears to be over in the conti-
nent.   According to the Mo Ibrahim index, the trend 
of future governance is influenced by the development 
of the target country: a sustained rather than massive 
increase in the development index brings along a major 
focus on human development, rule of law and so forth. 
A trend that is likely to remain, unless other factors of 
instability will manifest. And to this end, the water factor 
is likely to be the next challenge, not only for Africa, 
but for the rest of the world. According to a study of 
the UN, by 2025 even developed states in the continent 
will suffer scarcity of water. Competition for essential 
resources then erupts as one of the current and major 
challenges. This can be dealt with, according to some 
authors only if there will be an integration of the variety 
of political security architectures acting in the continent. 
In this respect  the current reform of the mechanism of 
the African Union will indeed provide another stabil-
ity enabling factor. By reducing the dependence from 
non-African support both in terms of financing, struc-
tures and capabilities, the AU could become the catalyst 
for integration. In this respect, even the G5 Sahel ini-
tiative promoted by France could further provide a sta-
bilizing effect in the Sahel region. There, the challenge 
lies in the commitment and will of the countries, and 
most of all, in identifying the right leaders, at any level, 
to carry out the irrefutable safe and secure environment 
tasks needed. In this respect, many initiatives of military 
assistance or, by using the new design, Security Force 
Assistance should provide in the mid-term the corner-
stone for effective security structures in the area. 
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The Western Sahel Region is considered today as one 
of biggest challenges of European foreign and security 
policies. The war in Libya in 2011 and the pressure of 
the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean has compelled 
political leaders in southern Europe, and the rest of Eu-
rope, to consider the geostrategic implications of the 
endemic problems of Western Sahel. The scarce infor-
mation about this region is indicative of the how glob-
al public opinion has neglected the strategic relevance 
of the region. This article intends to briefly outline the 
main sources of geostrategic concern and provide an 
indication of possible lines of intervention. 
What is a perfect storm? In popular knowledge, it is a 
combination of several factors which affect in a nega-
tive way, an existing event. This metaphor is intended 
to give the reader an immediate idea of the challeng-
es which affect Western Sahel and their practical im-
plications for operators of the international community 
on the ground. The Western Sahel region has endemic 
problems of poverty and development which have been 
statistically presented over the years by UN agencies and 
another NGO’s. This situation is further worsen by geo-
strategic competition, security threats and institutional 
weakness. These are the issues which I will address in 
order to create a framework of the debate about the 
international community involvement in Western Sahel. 
Geostrategic Competition 
Great powers have for centuries profoundly shaped the 
history of international relations through their statecraft 
and economic influence. So far, their role has evolved, 
but it has not shrunk in any meaningful way. Since great 
powers compete over influence in different areas of the 
world, it is imperative to analyse Western Sahel under 
this lens. Geostrategic competition can have different 
definitions, but in this case, it means a political struggle 
over influence in a specific territory through security 
means. France has been traditionally present in this re-
gion because of its former colonial ties to Mauritania, 
Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ciad, and other francophone 
countries in Africa. The spectrum of bi-lateral coopera-
tion between France and these countries stretches from 
cultural cooperation to defence cooperation. The inten-
sity of this relationship is not matched by any other 
country in Europe and the rest of the world. Following 
the successful Operation Serval in 2012, and given the 
growing terrorist threat in the region, to launch the re-
gional Operation Barkhane in 2014 to support the local 
security forces of Niger, Burkina Faso, Ciad, Mali and 
Mauritania to fight against terrorism. The deployment of 
such operation has the effect to regionalise the counter-
terrorism efforts already carried out in Mali. In 2015, the 
five countries already mentioned, created the G5 Sahel 
organisation and in 2016 this organisation became a se-
curity force with counter-terrorism and counter-traffick-
ing duties. France has been the main promoter of this 
initiative and it has hosted several summit to support 
the budgeting support for this initiative. While this poli-
cy has been presented as a gradual military withdrawal 
from the region, the fact that France has been the pro-
moter of this new regional effort in the evidence of its 
willingness to continue to exert its influence in the long 
term.
In 2017, Germany will soon open a military logistic hub 
in the airport of Niamey Niger to provide support to 
the UN peacekeeping operation in Mali MINUSMA. In 
2018, Italy has announced its willingness to enhance its 
bilateral military cooperation with Niger by sending a 
military contingent to support Nigerian security forces 
in the country.
The United States has been increasingly present in the 
region in the last years and it has stepped up its coop-
eration with G5 countries and its military presence. In 
Agadez Niger, the United States have built an air force 
base as a sign of enhanced military cooperation in the 
Region. Moreover, Niger and Mali are part of the White 
House Security Governance Initiative (SGI) which aims 
at strengthening the strategic planning of security forces 
in the region. Indeed, this is a sign of an unprecedented 
interest in the region. The fight against terrorist organi-
sations such as Boko Haram, and AQIM and the instabil-
ity in Libya have led to geostrategic appreciation of the 
Region and an accrued presence. 
China’s interest in Africa is already known and widely 
demonstrated through its economic and, more recently, 
its military presence. The Sahel presents however an in-
teresting opportunity for China because of its potential 
to act as a corridor between east and west Africa. There 
are several infrastructural projects to build trans-Saha-
ran highways like Cameroon-Chad-Sudan, Lagos-Cala-
bar, Lagos-Kano, which would make cross border eco-
nomic activity easier. This grand infrastructural vision, 
which will see China its main engine, if successful will 
determine a major shift in the economic life of the Sa-
hel and they bear the potential of stop the geograph-
ic isolation of these countries connecting them to the 
Ocean. It is interesting to note that none of these proj-
ect connect Sahel countries to the Mediterranean. This 
vision encourages these economies to use commercial 
ports in the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. This 
will generate jobs and opportunities southwards, not 
through the Sahara Desert. This, in the  medium term, 
may generate tension with populations that live thanks 
to the commercial activities in the Sahara.
The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which 
spiked in 201,  has had its consequences in the Sahel 
Avoiding the perfect storm: 
building long-term stability for 
the Sahel Region
by Pascal Carlucci
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and most likely it will continue to do so in the future. 
Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates have provided 
a large budgetary support for the creation of the G5 
Force. However, Qatar has enhanced its relations with 
both Mali and Burkina Faso creating a friction between 
countries inside the G5 Force. These dynamics provide 
further evidence of geostrategic competition in the Re-
gion. 
Security Threats 
The security threats in the Sahel stretch from illicit 
trafficking, terrorism and civil conflict. Globalisation, 
environmental problems and societal instability have 
rendered these security threats interconnected and ex-
tremely difficult to eradicate with the sole use of se-
curity and military tools. Moreover, European countries 
have “securitise” the current migrant crisis, especially 
the central Mediterranean Route, considering the large 
flow of migrants the result of illicit trafficking carried 
out by criminal organisations. 
The main illicit trafficks in the Region are:
1. Drug Trafficking: The Sahel is an important artery of 
the cocaine route from Latin America to Europe. (source: 
Cocaine Route Programme)
2. Human Trafficking: it is difficult to determine the 
number of people trafficked among the ones who mi-
grate along the central Mediterranean route. However, 1 
out 4 migrants is a woman or a child (source: Relifweb) 
and it is likely they are victims of trafficking. The traf-
ficking can be best described by listing the countries 
of origin, crossing and departure. This will give a more 
detailed picture that will help assess the problem and 
determine areas of intervention.
Terrorism is of paramount concern, especially after the 
Malian Crisis of 2012, where jihadist organisations have 
proved to be able to exploit tribal tensions in the coun-
try to seize territory and destabilise the area. Organisa-
tions like AQIM and MUJAO have the strategic objective 
to create safe havens in the Sahel. Recent events have 
shown that they can stage hit-and-run attacks against 
security forces which generate tension, especially in the 
Liptako-Gourma area between Mali, Niger and Burkina 
Faso. The G5 Force has been created to tackle terrorism 
and banditism especially in this area. 
Boko Haram is one of the most critical security threats 
to the Region, especially in Nigeria and the Lake Chad 
region. Although being severely damaged by the opera-
tions carried out by the Multinational Joint Task Force, 
this terrorist group has proved to be able to re-gener-
ate and adapt. The Sahel country more exposed to this 
threat is Niger, especially in the southeast province of 
Diffa. Niger has recently brought to justice several mem-
bers of this organisation and intends to heal some of 
the social wounds of the region in order to deny recruit-
ment and radicalisation. 
Institutional Weakness
The security threats faced by the countries in the Sahel, 
as described in the last paragraph, have the potential 
of being destabilising if they are not confronted with 
capable and well-resourced state institutions. The in-
ternational community has deployed capacity building 
missions and is investing in development programs and 
assistance which aim at strengthening the resilience of 
the 5 countries of Western Sahel. There is no trace of 
a common approach by the international community, 
but a state collapse in the Region would affect in a sub-
stantial way the security of Europe and other African 
countries. 
Mali and Niger are the largest recipient in security assis-
tance in the Region. Mali hosts a UN peacekeeping mis-
sion (MINUSMA) and two EU operations (EUCAP Mali 
and EUTM). Niger hosts EUCAP Sahel Niger and other 
bilateral assistance programs. Mali faces the challenge 
of maintaining providing security the entire country 
in order to slowly transition from the conflict of 2012 
into a more stable situation. Niger is the crossroads of 
trafficking in the region and it is experiencing security 
threats especially in the Liptako-Gourma area. If secu-
rity institutions of these two countries fail to maintain 
order and disrupt crime, the fragile equilibrium in place 
will be under threat.
Therefore, regardless of geostrategic competition, the 
international community should invest in long-term sta-
bility. The challenges which I briefly described in this 
article, have the potential of transforming a fragile situ-
ation into a perfect storm.
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I would like to start as a premise with a critical inter-
rogation of the concept of Sahel. The notion of a Sahel 
as an area distinct from the larger region of West Af-
rica or from North-West Africa (with the inclusion of 
the Maghreb countries) emerges in connection with the 
socio-economic crisis (drought and famine) of the early 
‘70s which calls for international attention and emergen-
cy and development assistance (Charbonneau, 2017). 
Originally defined as a geographical space between 
the Sahara desert and the forest area with ecological, 
economic and social features connected to nomadism, 
growing erosion of soil, irregularities of rains, food in-
security, it is seen as a “region” mostly for being the 
target of development and aid programs for combating 
drought, famine and hunger by international agencies 
and NGOs, in particular from Europe1. The Sahel coun-
tries themselves have encouraged such development-ori-
ented definition of the region with the establishment 
of regional forms of cooperation against desertification 
(i.e. the Sahel Initiative).
From a political point of view, however, international at-
tention toward the area was for many decades relatively 
low and fluctuating. Composed almost entirely of for-
mer French territories its security and the control of po-
litical instability (coups d’etat, military regimes, conflicts 
and protests) were largely demanded to France which 
acted through a combination of military assistance and 
bases, official development aid, support of local elites 
and leaders (Powell, 2017; Casola, 2018).
Major crises (like in the war between Chad and Libya on 
the Aouzou strip in the early ‘80s) were perceived as po-
tentially more destabilizing from a Cold War perspective 
for two main reasons: on the one hand, the involvement 
of the Qaddafi regime in regional affairs; on the other 
hand, the wider international and African scenario of 
East-West confrontation (Afghanistan, role of the USSR/
Cuba in the Horn of Africa and Angola). 
From an African comparative perspective (see also 
Dowd&Raleigh, 2013), the dynamics of crisis in the re-
gion was not so different from other regional conflicts 
in Africa  in the interplay of local and regional factors of 
instability and Cold War influences (i.e. Mobutu’s Zaire, 
the two Shaba crises and international intervention at 
the end of the ‘70s), but they were managed by a com-
bination of military and political-diplomatic strategies of 
both France and regional actors which wanted to avoid 
an escalation of internationalization of local conflicts 
along East-West lines.
The transformation of the Sahel in a “geopolitical re-
gion” or a “geostrategic crossroad”, a hotbed of threats 
to international security identified in Islamic terrorism 
1   For a recent assessment by ECHO/EU see https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/africa/sahel_en, last accessed 28/6/2018.
2   See Laurent, 2013.
associated with transnational criminal and/or illegal 
economic networks and trafficking, connected in turn 
to international migration and human mobility, is quite 
recent, especially if compared to other African regions 
(e.g. Sudan, Somalia, the Horn and Eastern Africa). De-
spite the Algerian civil war in the ‘90s and Quaddafi’s 
policies in the region, international attention to the Sahel 
as the source of “global threats” emerged only partially 
and slowly after 9/11 and the launch of “the war on ter-
ror” by the US administration. Perhaps more important 
was the escalation in the 2000s of the armed attacks of 
Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin, and its 
alleged alignment with global terrorist networks like al 
Qaeda which translated into a specular view of a global 
terrorist threat vs. a global war on terror which in a cer-
tain way have fed each other (Lecocq&Schrijver, 2007; 
Gutelius, 2007). 
As it is well known, it is in that period that the Pan-Sa-
hel Initiative was launched by the US and then expand-
ed in the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP) and the establishment of AFRICOM. But if com-
pared with other African regions (again above all the 
Horn of Africa) I would submit that the identification 
of the Sahel region as a security threat (a “Sahelistan”, 
as it has been called2) is even more recent and follows 
events like the so called Arab springs, the international 
intervention in Libya in 2011 and the fall of the Qadd-
afi’s regime. 
A further factor can be identified in the outbreak of 
the crisis in Mali in 2012, following the military coup 
in Bamako and the rebellion of the northern regions 
(Azawad) by a combination of Tuareg nationalist forces 
(MNLA) and Islamic jihadist insurgents which triggered 
off the French military intervention (Casola, 2018). Such 
events contributed to frame a political notion of the Sa-
hel as a geo-political region oscillating between a “larg-
er” definition (the greater Sahel with the inclusion of 
Gulf of Guinea countries, mainly Nigeria, and Maghreb 
countries, or even a Sahel arc of crisis, including North-
east Africa), and a “smaller” one, more focused on the 
countries most directly confronted with the “terrorist 
threat” and more connected with the Mali crisis. While 
the establishment of the G5 Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Mauritania, Niger, Chad) (ICG, 2017) is an expression 
of such narrower focus for the management of regional 
security, it also underlines the centrality of the military 
role played by Chad in the Mali crisis and in the re-
gion (Marchal, 2016). Chad is not a member of ECOWAS 
and it is the main headquarter of the French operation 
Barkhane (Hanne, 2017). It may be also worth noting 
that the G5 Sahel re-constitutes a French-speaking area 
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of military cooperation, which recalls traditional pat-
terns of influence compared with regional organizations 
(e.g. ECOWAS) with a more diversified colonial back-
ground (see also Tisseron, 2015).
More deeply, an operative definition of the Sahel with 
a focus on the G5 seems to reflect the compounding 
of distinctive phenomena like radical Islamic insurgen-
cies, criminal economic networks, informal transnation-
al trade routes and “irregular” migration flows in one 
major global security threat. Such a view is particularly 
pervasive in Europe/EU/Italy confronted after 2011 with 
a significant growth of asylum-seekers, refugees and mi-
grants from West Africa.
In the following pages, I will deal with domestic po-
litical factors which shape the current situation in the 
Sahel in a structural way, and that should be taken into 
account by external actors in order to forge long term 
sustainable political strategies. My observations are 
mainly based on the case of the Mali crisis and the G5 
countries.
1. From a structural/historical perspective, crises in the 
Sahel are linked to the patterns of state-building pur-
sued during the colonial period and in the post-colo-
nial framework. Competing notions of the indepen-
dent state emerged in the Sahara-Sahelian region in 
the late colonial period. The African elites’ national-
ist notion of a united centralized state, reproducing 
borders and political spaces derived from colonial-
ism, was challenged by alternative projects aimed at 
revising the established order with the creation, for 
example, of a trans-Saharan Tuareg polity. The issue 
of the “integration” of Tuareg populations in the new 
African states has been one of the major political 
issues in the whole post-independence period, giv-
ing birth to successive waves of conflict and cycles 
of conflict/negotiation/conflict since the 1960s in the 
countries concerned, especially in Mali and Niger 
(Lecocq, 2009). The 2012 rebellion and proclamation 
of the independence of Azawad in Mali can be seen, 
on one hand, as a phase of the long history of Tuareg 
rebellion; on the other hand it presents new features: 
the call for secession and independence of a single 
region (Azawad) by the MNLA (Gaasholt, 2015) dif-
fers from both a pan-Tuareg perspective and a strat-
egy aimed at negotiating domestic accommodation/
integration of the Tuareg elites within the Malian 
state. The Tuareg discourse in Mali seems to echo a 
more “modern” international language (the right to 
self-determination) and the emergence of new so-
cio-political actors (youth).
2. In most Sahelian countries the emergence of pat-
terns of conflict along identity or communal lines 
and/or the adoption of an ideological language and 
practice connected to radical Islam can be seen as 
the results of a failure of national integration. Rain-
eri & Strazzari (2015) see the Mali conflict in terms 
of competing state projects: the African nationalist, 
the secessionist pursued by Tuareg movements, and 
a global Islamic project rejecting the same notion of 
the nation-state in favor of a non-territorial entity of 
the Muslims (caliphate). While such categories can 
3   For a discussion see Baz Lecocq et al., 2013.
contribute to the understanding of the different po-
litical trajectories and ideological visions of the main 
actors of armed conflicts in the region, they may 
overestimate the consistency and coherence of the 
strategies pursued by the various politico-military ac-
tors in the field and above all the patterns of allianc-
es and competition which are much more fluid and 
rapidly changing than one could expect in terms of 
clear-cut state projects. 
3. Rather than formalize rigid and abstract definition of 
the African state as “weak”, “fragile”, “failed”, one can 
try to research and understand how the system really 
works beyond formal definitions of governance. In 
general terms the African state works on the basis 
of neo-patrimonial forms of governance, i.e. through 
networks of patron-client relations, aimed at eliciting 
consensus and build a relative stability of the politi-
cal order. Such systems can be quite effective in the 
short and medium term and in some cases elites in 
power have been able throughout Africa to remain 
in power for decades and navigate transition pro-
cesses toward competitive multi-party systems. Mali 
for example was long considered a success story of 
democratization and became the darling of interna-
tional financial institutions for its political and eco-
nomic reforms, decentralization policies and politi-
cal participation of the rural population. The military 
coup and the breakout of the conflict in northern 
Mali exposed the weaknesses of the “Malian democ-
racy” (Bøås&Torheim, 2013). Neo-patrimonial gover-
nance is in fact structurally unstable in the long run: 
it works through vertical and asymmetric relations, 
horizontal links are discouraged, produces unequal 
access to resources and service delivery. In short, it 
translated into differentiated patterns of inclusion/
exclusion of relevant sections of the population (so-
cial groups, identity/communal/sectarian/territorial).
4. The development of the Mali crisis in recent years 
shows that the North-South dichotomy traditionally 
used to “explain” the conflict is not adequate3. De-
spite the massive deployment of foreign troops un-
der the umbrella of international operations (from 
MINUSMA, Barkhane. EU Force, G5, etc.), the do-
mestic security situation is deteriorating especially 
in the central region of the country which witnesses 
a growth of inter-communal armed conflicts over re-
sources (land in particular). On the other hand, one 
can doubt the solidity of the “political system of the 
South” as if it were a separate polity. The strain in 
civil-military relations brought to light by the mili-
tary takeover in 2012 is a case in point, while protest 
connected with socio-economic grievances is taking 
place in urban centers of the Sahel (about protest in 
Bamako, see Siméant, 2014).
5. The North-South divide is often associated with an-
other dualistic cleavage between center and periph-
eral areas, generally defined as territories with no 
or weak State control, marginalized or excluded by 
State development programs, lacking in meaningful 
institutions of local government based on the recog-
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nition and participation of local forms of authority 
and governance; areas with porous borders, trans-
national networks of mobility of both goods (legal 
and criminal) and human beings, in short the reign 
of the so called informal economy and/or criminal 
networks. In the case of most of Africa, in the Saha-
ra-Sahel region, in Mali as in the Lake Chad basin, 
we have been witnessing the growth of uncontrolled 
border areas which have been defined as “ungov-
erned spaces” in the idiom of international politics 
(Raleigh & Dowd, 2013). But such picture can be 
challenged from different angles. First, one can ask 
if the traditional notion of “periphery” still holds. Pe-
riphery compared to what? Indeed border areas do 
not seem so peripheral for the networks of informal 
trade and services, for the creation of means of sub-
sistence for local population, and increasingly for the 
accumulation of wealth and capital by local elites, tra-
ditional and new. Second, one can ask whether pro-
cesses of accumulation of wealth based on criminal 
trafficking and illegal trade (smuggling or provision 
of transportation services for migrants for example) 
are not creating a new geography of centers of pow-
ers away from the capital or main “colonial” cities, 
sometimes with the re-emergence of routes, hubs, 
towns, of historical trans-Saharan traffics and human 
mobility (Grégoire&Bourgeot, 2011). Third, the “un-
governed spaces” are not a vacuum of power and 
authority only because they are not reached by State 
power. Indeed they are governed by a multiplicity of 
actors, local forms of governance, emerging or new 
forms of authority, with complex relations both be-
tween themselves and with forms of State authority 
and agents. Mark Duffield (2001), discussing armed 
conflicts in Africa, coined the notion of “emerging 
political complexes” to describe such situations. 
6. One of the features of the crises in the Sahel in the 
last decade is the emergence of new forms of po-
litical/armed mobilization which have seen alliances 
or the merging of local separatist forces, on the one 
hand, and jihadist movements claiming loyalty to a 
global struggle on the other hand. In retrospect such 
uneasy alliances look rather opportunistic, but it 
must be underlined that at a deeper social level they 
interact with micro dynamics of armed mobilization. 
Social groups at the local level may resort to the orga-
nizations of militias, self-defence groups in order to 
capture resources (including external aid flows), de-
fend their own social organization, moral economy, 
territory and land, from perceived external attacks 
(Guichaoua, 2011). For doing so they may employ 
the language and the ideological/political discourses 
of jihadism or separatism or African nationalism in 
order to pursue goals which are in fact localized and 
socially embedded. This contributes to very volatile 
patterns of alliances in the sense that local actors 
react to challenges and try to exploit opportunities 
more than pursuing consistent nation-wide or “glob-
al” strategies. The local micro dimension of conflict 
here as in other African cases (e.g. RDC) deserves 
more attention in the design of stabilization policies.
7. The region (as other parts of Africa) has witnessed 
an increasing militarization both from “above” (“war 
on terror” by the local states and international actors, 
stricter controls of borders to combat irregular mi-
gration and illegal flows) and from “below” (insur-
gencies and militarization of society). Such pervasive 
militarization blurs the distinction between regular 
state armed forces and the rebels. Whole political 
systems (an interesting case-study is Chad in Debos, 
2016) are based on a form of “institutionalized” mili-
tarization in which “rebel” forces of various kind may 
find accommodation into the national army follow-
ing peace agreements or ceasefires or changing strat-
egies by the President. Political or military leaders 
of the “State” can act through para-military groups 
or gangs, or sponsor and profit from illicit/criminal 
economic networks, self-defence forces or vigilantes 
both at the national and local level. It must be added 
that the militarization of society can be fed by the 
securitization of the Sahelian space through interna-
tional/regional military forces. Military strategies to 
tackle socio-economic or political issues - like the 
challenges related to migration flows across the Sa-
hara and illegal/criminal economies - may backfire. 
Already the promotion of security through military 
means has reduced the means of subsistence of lo-
cal populations engaged in informal activities with 
no other options in sight except militarization and 
migration. Finally, local perceptions and interpreta-
tions of war and peace, of international intervention 
as well as state strategies, should be taken more into 
account. As Bonnecase & Brachet (2013) underline 
in an interesting introduction to an issue of Politique 
africaine, the notion of “crisis” can be perceived dif-
ferently at the local level and even denied, while ex-
ternal interferences based on the same notion may 
deeply transform the local modes of governance in-
creasing insecurity and instability.
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Good morning everybody and thank you for inviting 
me to give this talk. Today I will talk about Econom-
ic Trends And Drivers In Sub-Saharan Africa. Perfor-
mances and Outlook. This is the topic that I have been 
asked to comment on. I will divide my speech into three 
parts. First, I will say something about the emergence of 
a “new” Africa, a topic that was already touched upon 
by some of the previous speakers. Secondly, I will stress 
the increasingly “multispeed” economic growth in the 
region. And, finally, I will try to sketch some possible 
scenarios for Africa’s future.
At the end of the Nineties, at the turn of the century, the 
predominant image of sub-Saharan Africa was one of 
lack of development, a failed continent. However, from 
the beginning of the new century this image changed 
quite a lot. A new narrative emerged by the name of 
“Africa rising” accounting for a region that had started 
to grow much faster and better than it did before. In 
particular, between 2000 and 2014, sub-Saharan Africa 
recorded an average growth of 5.6% per year. This is 
an average rate of growth, that is, it includes countries 
that did much better than that and countries that per-
formed less well. As a region, sub-Saharan Africa thus 
went from lagging behind up until the mid-Nineties – 
when compared to other regions or to the world aver-
age growth rates – to increase its pace of growth from 
around 1995-96, and then to run even faster starting 
from 2000. It actually approached the high growth rates 
of Asian countries. This was an unprecedented period 
for Africa in terms of economic growth. You have to go 
back to the 1960s and the early Seventies – just after 
independence – to find something similar. The recent 
period of growth was a sustained period that stretches 
back to 1995, so it has eventually consisted of about 20 
years of significant growth (1995-2014). And most coun-
tries in the region were affected by this growth, that is, 
they took part in it. Chad, Rwanda, Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leon were among the most 
impressive performers. 
It was also a period of growth that affected a number of 
sectors. For example, it was not only natural resources 
sector that expanded, but there was also significant ag-
ricultural growth. Africa has a huge agricultural poten-
tial, and yet for many years its agricultural production 
was in decline. But agriculture has started to be more 
productive in the period we are considering. Infrastruc-
tural development was also interesting in this period, 
with the construction of dams and roads and railways, 
such as the one from Addis Ababa to the Djibouti har-
bor. Development in the telecoms sector was also quite 
impressive, with the unexpectedly fast penetration of 
cell phones in the region. The banking sector similar-
ly expanded quite effectively, with a number of African 
banks gaining a foothold across the region. The same 
goes for tourism sector: countries like Ethiopia, Ugan-
da and Tanzania became important tourist destinations. 
And consumer goods also expanded: think for example 
of the western carmakers that opened assembly plants 
in places like Nigeria and Kenya.
So, what explains this turnaround, this period of un-
precedented economic growth at the turn of the centu-
ry? Most observers focus on four main drivers of growth. 
The first one: the export of commodities from Africa 
was very important. This was a period of favorable inter-
national commodity prices, particularly for oil, gas and 
mineral exports. As I said, we are used to look at what 
Africa produces mainly in terms of natural resources. 
This map shows a summary of the main resources that 
the continent exports Oil and gas are among the most 
prominent, but there is also abundance of copper in the 
“copper belt” region, as well as of iron, gold, diamonds 
and many other minerals. This was certainly an import-
ant driver of growth, but not the only one.
Another contributing factor was the fact that most Afri-
can countries, starting from around 1980, undertook key 
reforms of their economies under the so-called Structur-
al Adjustment Programmes. This was a painful process, 
especially in terms of social costs, but it nevertheless 
helped to produce some results in terms of better eco-
nomic growth. Today, the management of macroeco-
nomic policy in sub-Saharan Africa is generally better 
than what it used to be in past decades.
A third factor that allowed African countries to improve 
their growth performance was that multi-party elections 
were adopted virtually across the whole of sub-Saharan 
Africa during the 1990s, particularly in the first half of 
the decade. Of course sub-Saharan Africa is not a hot-
bed of democracy (even today, most governments re-
main non-democratic) but multi-party elections began 
to be adopted more widely, and governments thus be-
came gradually more accountable towards their citizens. 
They had to pay a little more attention to the outcomes 
of their actions, of the way they ruled, and this helped 
improve economic performances. At the same time, 
there was also a process of relative political stabiliza-
tion. We will later focus on issues related to conflicts in 
Africa. But let me point that the peak moment for polit-
ical instability in Africa was in the early 1990s, but since 
the mid-1990s and then in the subsequent decade the 
continent saw a gradual decline of civil wars. 
Fourthly, external support was the final key factor con-
tributing to growth. During the 1990s, a decline could 
be observed in development aid for Africa coming from 
Western or advanced countries. But aid began increas-
ing again with the new decade, alongside the adoption 
of debt cancellation initiatives.
Overall, the past fifteen-twenty years were also a peri-
od in which international players began to show a new 
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trust towards the region. Both on the part of advanced 
countries (Western countries: the US, France, the UK, 
even Italy with the former prime minister Renzi visiting 
for three years in a row the sub-Saharan region) as well 
as of emerging countries (the “China in Africa” story 
is well-known, but also India, Turkey, Russia, the Gulf 
States, and Brazil until it bumped into domestic trou-
bles) there was a very strong and mounting external in-
terest. This was for two main reasons. First of all, for the 
economic opportunities that Africa offered: a number of 
countries were and are interested in the resources we 
have mentioned. China’s industrialization process, for 
example, requires many of the mineral resources that 
can be found in Africa. But African countries also began 
to be seen as expanding markets, offering opportuni-
ties for exports and investments. Secondly, geopolitical 
interests were growing. Think, for example, not only of 
Islamic extremism, but also of the management of mi-
gration flows. 
So, on the basis of this kind of goals, how did exter-
nal actors engage with African countries? They used a 
number of traditional tools, such as diplomatic missions 
(many countries expanded their embassies network in 
the Continent); air connections (Turkish airlines, for 
instance, multiplied its African destinations between 
2009-2016, and now has more than 50); development 
aid went on the rise both for the US and for the UK; 
trade policies and an increased military presence were 
other instruments for gaining ground on the continent. 
But there was also a new strategy that was adopted by 
a number of countries, most notably by China. This may 
be called the “country-continent” conference. The FO-
CAC (Forum of China-Africa Cooperation) takes place 
every three years. It is a model that has been imitat-
ed by other countries. France, to be true, has actually 
employed similar conferences since as far back as the 
1970s. Much more recently, in 2016, even Italy orga-
nized its own conference with Africa.
External interests in Africa went hand in hand with the 
expansion of trade relations. Here you have a very clear 
pattern of increase from 2000 on in terms of import and 
export flows, from and to Africa. Total external trade 
increased fivefold from 2000 to recent years. And what 
is interesting is that this is not just about the export of 
mineral or natural resources from sub-Saharan Africa, 
but the import side (to sub-Saharan Africa) also went up 
significantly. A similar pattern can be seen for foreign di-
rect investments in the region, which increased from 10 
billion USD a year roughly in 2000, to some 40 billion 
USD in recent years. The red dot line shows how the 
share of foreign direct investments going to sub-Saharan 
Africa gradually went up. 
So, why did all this stop after 2014? Because between 
2014 and 2016 the global economic scenario changed 
a lot. China again had a major role in this, but there 
was an overall deterioration. One way we can look at 
this is by looking at the prices of commodities. In this 
graph you have groups of commodities for which, if we 
consider their price equal to 100 in 2010, you can see 
that the previous period was a period of price increas-
es, which helped supporting the growth of sub-Saharan 
economies. But the more recent period has been quite 
different. Most importantly, the price of oil dropped in 
late 2014. This was bound to affect Sub-Saharan Africa 
economies.
At the same time, it is very important to keep in mind 
that not all Sub-Saharan economies depend on the same 
exports. So the impact was different from country to 
country. For example, for a country such as Zambia, the 
total value of its exports is made up for 51% by copper. 
This is a good example of a country relying heavily on 
the export of a single product. Angola was similarly – 
actually, even more dependent on oil, accounting for as 
much as 90% of its export in 2016. At the opposite ex-
treme, we have countries whose exports are much more 
or significantly diversified. One example is Kenya: here 
you have cut flowers, tea, coffee and other products 
that are externally traded, with a much more complex 
overall picture. The same goes for Ethiopia, which also 
has relatively more diverse exports when compared to 
countries such as Zambia or Angola. If we shift to the 
Sahel region, we have countries such as Chad, whose 
economy essentially relies on oil, and others like Sen-
egal whose export is more diverse, + more similar to 
Ethiopia or Kenya. In between the two extremes we find 
other Sahelian countries, such as Mauritania, with iron 
and copper representing a large share of exports, but 
Mauritania also has other exports that are relevant as 
well. Mali, with a high share of exports being gold, Ni-
ger is the same with uranium. Thus, when assessing the 
kind of impact produced by the new global scenario on 
African economies, we need to keep this in mind. The 
World Bank and the IMF typically divide African coun-
tries in “non-resource-rich countries” and “resource-rich 
countries”, and among them we can distinguish between 
oil rich countries and countries exporting other miner-
als and metals.
Back to our starting point: there was a new economic 
scenario, globally, since 2014. What was the impact on 
economic growth in the African region? We can answer 
to this question by contrasting the growth that was re-
corded between 1995-2008, before the global financial 
crisis, with growth in 2015 through 2017. How should 
we look at this graph? On the horizontal axis, the more 
a county is on the right, the better they grew in the early 
period (1995 to 2008). On the vertical axis, on the other 
hand, countries have a higher position on the graph de-
pending on their performance in the period 2015-2017. 
We can thus group countries according to these colors: 
we have red countries down on the left that did pretty 
bad in the first period and in the second period as well. 
The yellow countries at the bottom on the right, they 
include the largest economies in the region (Nigeria, 
South Africa and Angola) and these are “slipping” coun-
tries, that is, countries that did much worse over the 
second period when compared to the first period. At the 
top of the graph we have two groups of countries. These 
are the countries that have being doing better over re-
cent years: we must always remember that, when the 
price of oil falls, there are countries that benefit from 
this. On the right hand, at the top of the graph, we have 
countries that kept doing well, such as Ethiopia, Rwan-
da and Tanzania. Overall, how can we sum up this situ-
ation? New difficulties have emerged, especially for the 
three largest economies in the region. At the same time, 
there has been “resilience” in a good number of coun-
tries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal 
and Tanzania. And overall we have a picture of increas-
ingly diversified trajectories, something we could also 
say for the diversifying political situation in the region. 
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Several key challenges remain for the region. This im-
age gives you a very clear perception of very limited 
access to electricity south of the Sahara. Electricity is 
only accessible to little more than one third of Africans, 
the overall production is inferior to Canada, and half of 
this is based in South Africa. It is not difficult to list a 
number of bottlenecks that constraint the opportunities 
for faster development in Africa. One key obstacle is the 
poor infrastructures that characterize the area, particu-
larly for landlocked countries. Sub-Saharan Africa counts 
as many as 16 countries that do not have direct access to 
the coast. Good infrastructures are key for their econom-
ic development, even more so for these countries than 
for other countries on the continent. Secondly, overall, 
poverty in percentage terms went down between 1990 
to 2012-2013. The share of the African population living 
in extreme poverty was reduced from 57% in 1990 to 
40-42% in 2012-2013. However, in absolute terms, due 
to the demographic growth of the region, we have today 
100 million more African poor compared to 1990. Insta-
bility, conflict and state fragility are another set of key 
challenges for development. A stable institutional frame-
work is essential for development. As for corruption, we 
still find a number of sub-Saharan African countries at 
the bottom of any international ranking of corruption. 
Low levels of education and human capital are also im-
portant hurdles. Then we have limited economic diver-
sification: economic growth between 2000-2015 did lead 
to a degree of economic diversification, with an expan-
sion of the services sector for example, but not so much 
in the manufacturing sector. This has been relatively 
disappointing. In addition, economic fragmentation re-
mains an important issue. Regional integration has thus 
far been limited. Sub-Saharan Africa is 70 times as large 
as Germany, so it is not unreasonable for it to be home 
to 49 independent states. The problem is that, in terms 
of their economic and demographic size, many of these 
countries remain very small. They thus need to “defrag-
ment” and integrate as much as they can, that is, to cre-
ate larger economic units. And finally, vulnerability to 
climate change and food crises are also crucial issues.
I will conclude by looking at present and future sce-
narios. First, where are we now? What is Africa like in 
2018? The continent has now completed its rebound. 
It grew pretty well until 2014, as mentioned, and then 
suffered a fall of GDP growth rates in 2015-2016. From 
2017, the region began to recover and is now expected 
first to reach a 3.4% growth in 2018, and then to stabi-
lize at around a 4% average growth over the next few 
years. This is a more moderate growth than in the past 
(i.e. the growth experienced during the first 15 years 
of the century) but this is because it is more heteroge-
neous growth. There are countries that are still running 
fast, and there are countries that are still struggling to 
recover.
What kind of Africa, then, if look further down the road – 
say, in 2020-2040? I want to try and offer you some food 
for thoughts. First, I think that we should increasingly 
look at Africa as an archipelago with more and more 
diverse trajectories, not just among countries (countries 
that are developing faster than others), but also between 
urban centers that will grow faster when compared to 
rural areas, and between coastal regions and inner re-
gions of the continent. So-called leapfrogging is another 
process that appears to be under way and will continue 
to affect the continent in coming decades. Technological 
development already offered Africa an opportunity to 
skip some of the expected phases of development (the 
use of mobiles money or drones are examples for this). 
Another important point has to do with regional in-
tegration. Here, I believe that sub-regions will “come 
first”. They will somehow continue to drive regional 
integration dynamics. We’ll probably see a number of 
sub-regional organizations – if certainly not all of them 
– possibly accelerating their integration. This is likely to 
happen in West Africa for example, as well as in South-
ern and Eastern Africa, where a faster pace in regional 
integration has already been displayed. In terms of sta-
bilization, we will continue seeing a nucleus of remain-
ing instability at the core of the continent. This will be 
a T-shape double arc of instability that crosses part of 
the Sahel towards the east and the Horn, and also down 
in the middle across Central Africa and Eastern Congo. 
Finally, the continent will be increasingly “on the move”, 
both externally, with migration flows towards the Glob-
al North, as well as internally with intra-Africa migra-
tions, that is, movements from one African country to 
another. The latter already represent about two-thirds 
of all African migration. But with African countries ex-
periencing increasingly diverging development trajecto-
ries, intra-African migrations might become even more 
common.
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Since 1995, the African continent has been experiencing 
an extraordinary period of development and growth, 
mostly unknown in the decades before. Tens of millions 
of Africans are living in new socio-economic conditions 
and the future perspectives seem positive, with more de-
velopment, social inclusion and economic wealth. Nev-
ertheless, there are still strong inequalities amongst the 
African population and many social factors are boosting 
old conflictual situations and creating new cleavages. 
In general terms, inequalities emerge both at intrastate, 
within the African societies, and at interstate level. Geo-
graphically speaking, there is one Africa, whose borders 
are well defined and separate Africa from the rest of 
the world. This element contributes in forging the idea 
of a single, monolithic and homogeneous reality. While 
the African institutions and leaders are pushing through 
the longstanding ideology of “Panafricanism”, both at 
political, economic and socio-cultural level, we should 
address African issues considering more «Africas».
Mediterranean Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the 
Gulf of Guinea, Southern Africa and the other geopolit-
ical and geo-economic regions express a multitude of 
different factors. At socio-cultural level, most of the Af-
rican Countries and regions still have to confront them-
selves with conflicting factors belonging to ethnicity, 
religion and nationalism.
Even though most of the nowadays internal conflicts 
and of the civil wars are driven by the will and strategy 
of some political actors to exasperate those elements to 
support and justify their propaganda, we still have to 
consider their complexity when we want to provide us 
with proper analyses and explications about the nowa-
days African situation and its future developments.  
1. Starting from the demographic aspects, it’s quite ev-
ident that the African continent could not be considered 
as a whole. In 2017 the African population accounted 
for 16% of the world population, with 1.256 billion peo-
ple. 47% of the total population leaved in 6 Countries: 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, DRC, Tanzania and South Af-
rica. 









On the other side, more than 20 African Countries had 
a population smaller than that of London. This element 
simply suggests the need, both at intellectual and op-
erative level, to avoid a “one-size-fits-all” approach in 
defining and analyzing African issues.
Africa has the highest rate of population growth in the 
world, with an annual average increase of 2.5% experi-
enced in the 2010-2015 period, and a high probability 
that this rates will decrease only at a slow pace in the 
next decades, with a growth of 1.75-2% in 2050. This 
means that, by the half of this century, more than half of 
global population growth is expected to occur in Africa 
and that Africa’s population will inevitably double. 
According to United Nations’ projections, depending on 
the number and quality of reforms and programmes ad-
opted by national governments and African institutions 
in health, family planning and social communication, 
the African population could become, by the end of this 
century, from 3 to 6 times larger than today, most likely 
reaching 4 billion by 2100 (more than 35% of the world 
population). 
The population of Africa is increasing due to a signifi-
cant gap between births and deaths, in the measure of 
four to one. Mortality and fertility rates are the high-
est in the world: African women have 4.5 children on 
average, compared to just 2.1 children on average in 
Asia and 2.0 in Latin America. Of the 20 high-fertility 
countries in the world, 18 are in Africa, the largest being 
Niger, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Mali and Chad.
At the same time, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for near-
ly 40% of the neonatal deaths worldwide, with a mor-
tality rate, in 2016, of 53 infant deaths per 1,000 births 
(the world average is 30.5), with the highest rates being 
in western and central Africa,  
Both mortality and fertility rates decreased in recent de-
cades, and will keep on decreasing in the next decades, 
according to the UN. 
Nevertheless, in the near future there won’t be a de-
crease in the growth rate of the African population, due 
to the so called “demographic inertia” that the continent 
is experiencing.
Half of the African population, especially in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, is and will be in the reproductive age (15-49), 
providing high birth rates in the next decades. 
With 1 billion African under 25 years old expected by 
2100, there will be a “youth bulge” that will probably 
produce hard challenges to the African Countries. Afri-
can institutions should be able to provide food, houses, 
education, health, social services and jobs to hundreds 
of millions of young people. One of the clearest exam-
ples is Nigeria, the largest African Country in terms of 
population and the richest in terms of GDP. In 2017, 80 
million Nigerians where younger than 14 years old (42% 
Social features and dichotomies 
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of the population), Nigeria nominal GDP per capita was 
only 1,994 US$ a year, and nearly half of the population 
lived in poverty.
There is wide consensus amongst scholars and academ-
ics that this youth bulge of the African population will 
produce more internal conflict in the years to come. 
Socio-economic grievances and political clashes will 
be strongly fueled by the youngest part of the African 
population, especially where there will be a stronger 
perception about inequality levels between the richest 
minority and the poorest majority.
Another relevant element regarding the African conti-
nent is the strong increase in life expectancy achieved 
in recent years. At global level, life expectancy at birth 
rose from 67 to 70 years, with the greatest increases in 
Africa, where life expectancy rose by 6 years in the first 
decade of the 21st Century, after having risen by only 2 
years in the previous decade. 
Nevertheless, Africa is still far away from the data re-
garding the other regions in the world: life expectancy 
in Africa in 2010-2015 stood at 60 years, compared to 72 
years in Asia, 75 years in Latin America and the Caribbe-
an, 77 years in Europe and in Oceania and 79 years in 
Northern America. Until now, the demographic pyramid 
of Africa experienced no relevant evolutions; it is at the 
same level it was in the Seventies of the 20th Century. 
From now on, African society will start to become older: 
By 2100, the number of African people of 65 years and 
older are expected to grow by 5 times the current level. 
This will have significant impacts on the socio-economic 
sphere, creating new grievances from the population for 
better and larger health and social services. The polit-
ico-institutional agenda of the national and local gov-
ernments will have to consider those aspects, and the 
African Countries will be facing new challenges to ad-
dress institutions that, in many cases, are still fragile and 
inadequately equipped.
2. One of the good news about Africa is related with the 
significant developments in the health sector through-
out the Continent. Public health programmes have been 
increasing in quantity and quality, allowing millions of 
people to benefit for healthcare services unknown in 
the previous decades. Just to provide an example, the 
mortality rate of children under 5 years old– consid-
ered one of the clearest indicators of development in the 
health sector – is around 80 every 1,000 births, while it 
was 177 in 1990. 
Data linked to Hard and violent epidemic diseases, such 
as AIDS/HIV, experienced a decrease of the number of 
people affected and of the victims. In many Countries, 
especially in Eastern and Southern Africa, when histor-
ically lays the largest bulk of victims, millions of peo-
ple could benefit from new medicines and therapies. In 
Eastern and Southern Africa, home to half of the total 
number of people living with HIV in the world (19.4 
million people In 2016), data shows that the number 
of people living with HIV and taking an antiretroviral 
therapy has more than doubled since 2010, and there is 
large consensus that, by 2030, HIV/AIDS will no more 
be considered a public health threat in Africa. 
Nevertheless, Africa still lies at the bottom of the world 
rankings in health and sanitation and many Countries 
missed to reach the United Nations Millennium Devel-
opment Goals. The March 23rd, 2014 Ebola outbreak in 
Guinea was a clear example of the fragility of the health 
systems in Africa. The Ebola epidemic that widespread 
throughout West Africa destroyed lives, decimated com-
munities, and orphaned children. More than 11,000 
people died of the disease. Even if the number of vic-
tims could not be compared with the millions of death 
caused every year summing up AIDS/HIV, malaria and 
tuberculosis, Ebola has slowed down economic growth 
and closed down businesses, blocking for more than a 
year the economic relations of Guinea, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, and their neighbours, affecting the livelihood of 
millions of people, already being part of the poorest in 
the world. In the next decades, unfortunately, new simi-
lar diseases’ outbreaks are likely to occur in many areas 
of the continent.
Even if the African continent is experiencing a rapid 
and constant economic growth, unknown until 30 years 
ago, most of the African people, especially those living 
in the Countryside, lack proper and constant access to 
basic services and needs. While in Africa lives more than 
half of the 1.2 billion world population that doesn’t have 
access to electricity, there is a larger access to mobile 
phones lines than to sanitation facilities. 
Despite being rich, in overall terms, in water and land, 
most of African people do not have access to fresh water 
and to arable land, even in those areas where water and 
land are physically abundant. The economic scarcity of 
water and land are one of the biggest problems in Afri-
ca, and will likely trigger instability and limit develop-
ment in many areas throughout the continent. The case 
of DRC is one of the clearest and paradoxical examples: 
the Congo basin contains 50% of the African fresh wa-
ters and its 2.4 billions square meters of territory could 
be largely used for agricultural activities, both for crops 
and forestry. Nevertheless, the Congolese population 
lacks of a proper access to both water and land and is 
one of the poorest in the world.
3. Education levels are one of the key indicators to 
understand if a Country has started the paths of devel-
opment and are fundamental elements when we look at 
the youngest part of the population. 
Nowadays, Sub-Saharan Africa has an average of 69.5% 
primary enrollment ratio, which is much higher than 
the 54.3% experienced in 2000, with Mauritius, Kenya 
and Seychelles being largely above the world average 
of 89%. On the contrary, some Western and Central Af-
rican Countries are still far away from having reached 
sustainable levels.
In general terms, more than 50% of the Africans are not 
enrolled in the secondary and tertiary school, or do not 
successfully finish their courses, and the African people 
with a university degree are still few, especially if com-
pared to other developing Countries in Asia and Latin 
America. Nevertheless, part of the population is experi-
encing a solid education path that could pose the grass-
roots for future development and growth, both from an 
economic, social and political point of view.
4. Africa is still the least urbanized area in the world 
with nearly 60% of its population leaving in the country-
side. Currently, nearly 500 million people leave in urban 
areas across the continent. While Sub-Saharan Africa is 
often regarded as the world’s fastest urbanizing region, 
this record still belongs to Asia. Nevertheless, African 
cities are experiencing a fast growth rate and the African 
urban population will likely double in 2050, almost two 
thirds of this phenomenon will affect the urban areas.
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Most of the actual urban growth is fueled by migration 
flows from rural areas, and that will be a great growth 
factor also in the future. In the next years Western, East-
ern and Southern Africa will experience the expansion 
of megalopolis, like Lagos, Nairobi, Luanda, Johannes-
burg and others. Lagos, in particular, could become the 
world most populated city in the world by 2100, with 
nearly 100 million people. 
In some cases, the urbanization process will create the 
bases for transnational integration processes, for exam-
ple between Kinshasa and Brazzaville, in Central Africa. 
There is no doubt that urbanization management and 
policies will play a tremendous role in generating devel-
opment opportunities or, on the contrary, in triggering 
instability and conflicts.
The tremendous demographic growth experienced by 
Africa and its fast urbanization process, brings many 
questions about the sustainability and the capacity of 
the national political leadership and of the regional 
institutions to manage the flows of millions of people 
moving within Countries, across regions and throughout 
the continent.
Although the focus is often on African migration to Eu-
rope, Middle East and North America, the bulk of Afri-
can migration takes place within the continent. People 
move across Africa looking for economic opportunities, 
fleeing from conflicts or leaving climate-weak areas. 
Contemporary African international migration flows 
therefore remain largely intra-regional in nature and not 
to the global North as media perceptions strongly por-
tray. To show some evidence:
•	 In Sub-Saharan Africa, intra-regional migration is 2/3 
of the total African migration flows. 
•	 The major destination Countries are South Africa, 
Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia. 
•	 West Africa is the region with the highest rate of 
intra-regional movements (84% of migration move-
ments of the area are internal flows). The cross-bor-
der component of the African migration flows still 
depends also on its past legacies, reflecting the ar-
bitrary nature of most national boundaries inherited 
from the colonial period.
•	 Overall, people living in high or middle-income 
Countries tend to migrate outside the continent, 
while people living in poorer Countries show a more 
regional-based model of migration. This is the case 
of Somali people moving to Kenya, or Zimbabweans 
moving to South Africa.
•	 A different result comes from Countries or regions 
experiencing some form of armed conflicts, political 
instability or authoritarian regimes In those cases, 
people tend to escape in search of a more peaceful 
life.  
While considering the future of migration flows and ur-
banization processes, we should have an eye to the role 
played by remittances, that have become a fundamental 
factor for many developing Countries in terms of the for 
local economic growth. According to the World Bank, 
remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa grew to $37.8 billion 
in 2017, and are forecast to hit around $39.2 billion in 
2018 and $39.6 billion in 2019.
Nigeria is the top recipient, which account for two-
thirds of remittance flows into the region, followed by 
Egypt, Morocco, the “Sudans”, Ghana, Senegal, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda. For many Afri-
can Countries, remittances account for a significant part 
of their GDP, with the impressive examples of Liberia 
(25.9%), Comoros (20.2 %), The Gambia (20.0 %), Leso-
tho (17.4 %), Senegal (10.3 %), and Cabo Verde (10.2%).
5. To conclude, the African continent could not be de-
scribed as “hopeless” or “rising”, as the famous interna-
tional magazine “The Economist” defined it, precisely, in 
2000 and 2013.
There is space for great hope and profound sorrow at 
the same time, because all the indicators we analyze 
tend to provide us with this schizophrenic perception. 
Demographic and economic data tell us that Africa is in 
the middle of a solid, constant and increasing growth 
path. No doubts about it. The Africans will be increasing 
their number and their overall wealth. The bad news 
and the uncertainty related with them, emerge when 
we consider the diverging directions that the African 
population is experiencing, with a smaller part becom-
ing wealthier, more educated and linked with the outer 
world, and the majority of the Africans being even poor-
er or not becoming rich, marginalized from the internal 
and international trends and, paradoxically, more aware 
of their scanty conditions.
Recent evolutions in the continent are showing us that 
opportunities and threats go hand in hand, creating po-
tential tensions both at internal and regional level. The 
African continent future developments at social level 
are quite easy to understand and intercept but there is 
no clear indication on whether they will contribute to 
development, stability and growth or, rather, they will 
foster slowdown, instability and depletion, therefore 
creating new sources of conflict. 
Each Country, dynamic and factor should be addressed 
specifically, avoiding generalizations and superficiality, 
that for long have been the African evolutions’ analysis 
drivers.
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My talk proposes a chronological perspective of the cri-
sis which hit Mali in 2012 and that since then has affect-
ed the Sahel more broadly since 2012. This relatively de-
scriptive, historical approach aims at providing a factual 
account of the crisis, but, more importantly tries to cap-
ture the main transformations of recent waves of politi-
cal violence, which emerged in the backdrop of decades 
of cyclical separatist violence and state repression. 
Opting for this approach has one important virtue, 
namely, to make clear that recent history is not the 
product of a pre-written script shaped by permanent 
structures of Sahelian/Saharan polities but stems from 
choices and decisions made by actors embroiled in a 
multi-party conflict, and often myopic. Stressing the role 
of these protagonists is a way to realize that other cours-
es of history were possible. 
Also, after the consideration stemming from the col-
lapse of the Malian state, most studies have tended to 
focus on drivers of radicalization, i.e. adopted an insur-
gent-centric approach. Differentiating between waves 
of violence is a way to move away from this exclusive 
framework and to recognize that states contribute to a 
system of interactions engendering violence, yet poorly 
understood. If one wants to envisage long term solu-
tions to the present conflict, inquiring why young men 
take up arms against the government may not suffice.
Three phases of armed violence can be identified in re-
cent times, involving and affecting different actors and 
demanding different responses. In a nutshell, the three 
phases are as follows:
1. Recurring separatist rebellions and imported jihadi 
violence. One could talk of imported jihadi violence 
until the early days of the 2012 insurgency as jihadi 
leaders who took over Mali were mostly coming from 
Mali’s neighbouring countries, and notably Algeria. 
Domestic political violence was essentially perpetrat-
ed by separatist, mostly ethnic Tuareg insurgents.
2. Endogenous jihad. After the occupation of Northern 
Mali in 2012, the French intervention decapitated the 
jihadi movements yet did not destroyed them. The 
foreign jihadi leadership was replaced by local ac-
tors recruiting in specific community networks, one 
could then talk of endogenous jihad. In parallel, sep-
aratists signed a peace agreement with the govern-
ment, hence letting jihadi movements monopolising 
armed contestation against the government.
3. Militianised violence. The endogenization of jihad 
and its community-based recruitment provoked vi-
olent responses emanating from communities not 
aligned with the jihadists and targeted by them, 
sometimes explicitly supported by the government 
or the international forces, sometimes just tolerat-
ed by the latter. One then sees appear a Hobbesian 
militianisation of the society in parallel with count-
er-terrorism efforts. These processes are particularly 
at work in the Central part of the country and at the 
border between Mali and Niger.
What follows deepens the historical sequence adopted.
Mali pre-2012 was culturally and politically split and 
witnessed recurring rebellions led by ethnic Tuareg and 
notably the Ifoghas tribe, considering themselves as the 
main losers of the post-independence power structure. 
Rebellions occurred in 1963, the 1990s, 2006 and 2012. 
The government tested several methods to extinguish 
the recurring rebellions ranging from blind force (1963) 
to negotiated compromise (1990s). None of the options 
stopped armed dissent. In the immediate aftermath of 
the 2006 rebellion, the government privileged an indirect 
containment strategy to control its northern periphery, 
consisting in relying on a web of co-opted loyal armed 
actors. In short, to mitigate the North/South cleavage, 
the Malian authorities deepened North/North divisions. 
They crucially empowered Arab and Tuareg groups oc-
cupying low ranks in tribal hierarchies to keep on check 
Arab and Tuareg groups historically most hostile to the 
state. In this fragmented political landscape, jihadists 
driven out of Algeria at the end of the Algerian civil 
war, took root in Northern Mali and, through profitable 
hostage-taking operations expanded their capabilities 
and local influence. Interestingly enough, jihadists en-
tertained close business ties with pro-government prox-
ies in the North.
The collapse of Qadhafi’s regime in 2011 precipitat-
ed the activation of a rebellion in the making. Tuareg 
combatants of Malian origin formerly serving Qadhafi 
in Southern Libya returned to Mali with weapons and 
boosted the separatists’ military capabilities. “Now or 
never” was their motto. In February 2012, they defeated 
a weak Malian army, which was further disorganized fol-
lowing a coup in the capital Bamako. With no support 
from Bamako, the pro-government militias retreated, 
fled to neighboring countries or joined rebels on an in-
dividual basis. On April 6th 2012, the Tuareg separatists 
established the capital of the newly liberated “Azawad”.
Yet the Tuareg separatists were not alone. Most of their 
military victories against Malian forces (notably the Tes-
salit siege in February 2012) were obtained with the 
decisive support of jihadi armed groups as part of a 
circumstantial alliance to repel the state from the North. 
Jihadi movements were enthused by the opportunity to 
impose the Sharia Law over newly conquered territories. 
Relations between separatists and jihadists soon turned 
sour as the former proved incapable of governing pop-
ulations under their authority. Jihadists took advantage 
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of the growing hostility against the separatists to kick 
out the separatists and establish a 10-month spell of 
uncontested rule over northern Mali, splitting the com-
mandment of the territory in three: Al Qaeda in Islamic 
Maghreb ruled Timbuktu and its region; the Movement 
for the Oneness of Jihad in West Africa ruled the Gao 
province while Ançar Eddine (the only jihadi outfit com-
manded by a Tuareg, Iyad Ag Ghaly) took the control 
of Kidal. 
In January 2013, the French intervention decapitated the 
jihadi movements: many of their foreign leaders were 
killed (including the emblematic Algerian commander 
Abu Zeid) or fled (such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who 
coordinated the Tiguentourine attack against a gas com-
plex in Algeria and the Agadez and Arlit attacks in Niger 
in Jan 2013 and May 2013). Remaining jihadists in Mali 
licked their wounds and rekindled their leadership, not 
without tensions though: the appointment of Nouini in 
replacement of Ahmed Tilemsi (killed by the French) 
in the Gao region is said to have provoked the split of 
Abu Walid Al Sahraoui and his rapprochement with the 
Islamic State. 
As jihadists reconfigured their organizational model, 
the separatists, the government and the government’s 
armed proxies entered talks to put an end to separat-
ists’ grievances. The shaky process, driven by Algeria, 
eventually led to the signature of an agreement in June 
2015, followed by informal mini-agreements aimed at 
solving murky (business-related) disputes among North-
ern armed elites. The peace-process, really much based 
on old “Westphalian” recipes (delegation of power, re-
gional assemblies, DDR etc.), has progressed extremely 
slowly since. Most notably, the (former) separatists are 
still the dominant force in Kidal and have multiple bas-
es elsewhere in the North while pro-government mili-
tias still roam the desert and have been transformed as 
counter-terrorism-outfits through the French Operation 
Barkhane. In the meantime, the UN has deployed troops 
in charge of monitoring the cessation of hostilities, sup-
porting the peace-process and reinforcing Malian state 
capacities.
Jihadist eventually did more than just reshuffle their 
leadership and remaining military capabilities. They ex-
panded their activities geographically and refilled their 
ranks. The most notable transformation of their activi-
ty is their expansion in Central Mali, where they were 
able to capitalize on anger against the state among spe-
cific disenfranchised communities, particularly target-
ed by state’s repression. The opening of this new front 
massively disrupts local stability (schools closed, civil 
servants relocated), on a terrain not covered by French 
counter-terrorism operations. 
2017 was a dramatic year for the Malian army, which 
suffered important losses, as most available databases 
indicate. While the process started earlier, 2017 illus-
trates blatantly the endogenization of the jihadi insur-
gency. The violence has provoked disastrous state re-
sponses, consisting in co-opting militias among commu-
nities at odds with those joining the jihadi ranks - more 
than intrinsically loyal to the government. This is what 
we call the militianisation of the conflict, which is now 
increasingly resembling a civil war. In the Centre, the 
army commits abuses against populations while Dogon 
and Dozo militias settle scores with their Fulani counter-
parts. At the border between Mali and Niger, the French 
military are in an explicit deal with two communi-
ty-based militias taking advantage of counter-terrorism 
support to inflame old feuds with local Fulani groups, 
costing dozens of lives in both camps and spilling over 
borders. 
One may consider these counter-terrorism options as 
pragmatic, driven by urgency and temporary. Indeed, 
France and its Sahelian partners have developed long 
term plans to deal and prevent terror, via the so called 
G5 Sahel Joint Force. The G5 Sahel may have more le-
gitimacy to intervene militarily than the former colonial 
power. Yet financial, political and technical hurdles are 
huge and its operationalisation is terribly slow, risking 
to transform the temporary, suboptimal and highly dan-
gerous solutions into permanent ones.
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